Terror in Kenya and pathological domestic politics: a recipe for disaster

I’ve fucking had it. I recommend that all Americans live in a country where terror attacks are a common occurrence. 9/11 was a huge wake-up call for the States, but the daily threat of terror, with all of its unpredictability impacts every aspect of life, even in ways which may not be immediately obvious.

I’m not stupid. I know that I’m much more likely to be hit by a car in Nairobi than to be killed in a terror attack, but I can at least minimize the risks of being hit by an automobile. Terror attacks, on the other hand, come from nowhere.

The Kenyatta administration has proven itself completely incapable of dealing with issues of security. It’s pathetic appropriation of the Mpeketoni attacks for petty domestic squabbles is at least as embarrassing as it is dangerous.

From Think Africa Press:

Initially, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for Mpeketoni killings through a spokesperson, declaring that Kenya was now “officially a war zone.” However, in a speech to the nation the next day, Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta dismissed the notion that the Islamist militants were behind the attack, maintaining instead that it was “politically motivated ethnic violence.”

Though he did not explicitly mention names, local media outlets interpreted Kenyatta’s allegations as being aimed at the leader of the opposition, Raila Odinga. In response to these apparent accusations, Odinga in turn blamed the Kenyatta administration for failing to address the security situation since Westgate and called for the resignation of Joseph ole Lenku, Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government.

Opposition leader Raila Odinga, a seasoned Luo politician affiliated with the Orange Democratic Party, has been rattling the cage for the past few months, demanding a “dialogue” with the Presidential office. Kenyatta, who ran on a platform of unity, appears uninterested in engaging the Luo stalwart.

If he doesn’t engage Raila, we’re guaranteed a day of demonstrations and inevitable rioting on July 7th, the day celebrating the birth (return to?) multipartyism in Kenya during Moi’s disastrous Presidency. It’s going to be a bloodbath, and Kenyatta will be watching in the safety of the State House. Most likely, though, he’ll be quietly watching football. Regular folks will be blaming this or that tribe for the fallout and we’ll slowly return to the bad old days of tribal violence.

Most troubling is Kenyatta’s refusal to engage the West, instead trying to curry short-term favors from China. A new road to allow Kenyan elites to move around the outskirts of Nairobi is worth more than solid security assistance from the West. Even more troubling is the seeming lack of interest from the Obama admin to a spreading terror threat in East Africa. Recruitment among Kenyans has become even easier given Kenya’s growing political divide, providing a ripe breeding ground for violence which could spread far beyond Kenya’s borders and potentially destabilize the most important economy in East Africa.

From Think Africa Press:

A domestic threat
So far this year, there have been 14 attacks in Nairobi, Mombasa and the nearby coastal tourist area, according to data from Terrorism Tracker. By contrast, there were just eight such incidents in these areas in the whole of 2013. This also marks a geographical shift in the threat, with attacks now being more common in Nairobi, Mombasa and the coast than in the northeastern region bordering Somalia. Although al-Shabaab continues to mount infrequent mass casualty operations inside Kenya, it seems to be Kenyan militant groups operating from Nairobi and Mombasa that now pose the greatest threat.

So the line between Al Shabab and local “militant groups,” the nature of which is mostly unknown, the credit for which goes to a policy of non-communication from the Kenyan Government itself. The Americans are quite good at identifying the nature of the threats, though also quite adept at defining it thereby giving militant groups an opportunity to mold their images in the shape of how the West perceives it. Here, that opportunity doesn’t exist. On the surface, this seems like a destabilizing strategy for militant groups, but in reality, it merely exacerbates the threat by giving it no ideological boundaries to operate in. The violence becomes random, and hobbles the ability to politically engage these groups.